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THE THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL PREDICAMENT 
OF AMERICAN JEWRY
Leo Strauss, in an autobiographical aside, spoke of being in the grip of a “theologi-
cal political predicament” as a young man. He meant by this something like the fol-
lowing. For modern Jews the constellation of religious beliefs that seems to them 
reasonable and compelling—the theological horizon, so to speak—is constrained 
by the political horizon. They are spiritually indebted, to the point of dependency, 
on the values of the political system, which, for the lucky ones at least, derive from 
the Enlightenment. Judaism therefore depends on the Enlightenment. But what 
happens when confidence in the Enlightenment begins to wobble and Judaism, 
now weakened by its dependency, lacks the strength to make up the difference?
In Strauss’ day, this predicament took a particular form. Jews were wedded 
to a liberal solution to the Jewish problem: equal citizenship under the law was 
to have solved the perennial problem of Jewish suffering. They turned in hope 
to the realization of this ideal not in messianic time, but in their time. They had 
accommodated their religion, their traditional way of life, to suit the requirements 
of a liberal era. Their theological imagination had become liberal to its core. In the 
process, they lost the ability and the readiness to endure suffering as their ancestors 
had done. Jewish suffering became an anomaly for liberal Jews, an aberration in 
a liberal era rather than a metaphysical constant. The beliefs of the ancestors had 
become implausible, but the beliefs of the moderns, of the liberals, were also beco-
ming implausible, and more so every day. Hence the predicament: with weakened 
faith in both traditional Judaism and in the possibility of a liberal solution there was 
almost nowhere to turn.
VI
II:
 20
11
 n
r 2
230 ALAN MITTLEMAN
For American Jews, the theological political predicament is much less dire 
but it does nonetheless involve their long-term viability as a community. For many 
American Jews, no less than for German Jews, liberal norms, hopes, and convic-
tions have become the substance and limit of their theological imagination. Let 
me illustrate this with two concrete examples. For many years, when I taught at 
a liberal arts college, every semester at least one of my students wanted to write 
a research paper on intermarriage. Typically, this student had a good Jewish upbrin-
ging and active Jewish involvement. Most likely the student had told his friends 
that he would only date other Jews and hoped someday to marry a Jew. His friends 
then chastised him, implying that he was guilty of prejudice or bigotry for discrimi-
nating against non-Jews as potential dates or mates. The student became confused 
and wanted to work through his conflicted values, his theological-political predica-
ment writ small, in a paper.
Although this predicament sometimes took the form of adolescent peers as-
serting, in the name of personal freedom, their right to date whomever they wish, 
this was not always the case. What was at stake was not liberty or autonomy or 
expressive individualism, but a specific worry about discrimination. Choosing to 
date only Jews seemed to violate a deep-seated taboo. It made a distinction, thought 
to be invidious, between persons on the basis of religion or ethnicity. One might 
ascribe this to adolescent zealotry or confusion, but adult Jews appear to be no less 
zealous or confused. In a 2000 American Jewish Committee survey, 50% of Ame-
rican Jews answered that it was “racist” to insist that Jews marry only other Jews. 
This and other more recent surveys show an erosion of resistance to the very idea of 
intermarriage. Not only has intermarriage lost its taboo quality but many American 
Jews seem to affirm it as a triumph of open-mindedness and liberty over a discre-
dited tribalism. American Jews seamlessly transfer liberal norms of conduct, fully 
appropriate to law and to civil society, to the Jewish sphere without hesitation. The 
theological horizon is constrained by the political imagination.1
My second example is drawn from an interview in the Forward (November 
2, 2001) with Playboy’s Miss November 2001, Lindsey Vuolo. Ms. Vuolo is a pro-
ud Reform Jew and chose to include a photo of her Bat Mitzvah in the montage of 
nude pictures. When asked about the compatibility of her Playboy exposure with 
her Judaism, she reflected: “Some people will look up to this as a positive thing. 
With all the Chandra Levy and Monica Lewinsky talk, it’s a bit weird. But I think 
what I’m doing is positive. I’m not doing anything religiously wrong. I’m not being 
exploited—it’s my choice.”
Although she began to have some qualms during Yom Kippur, she managed 
to quiet her conscience. As the Forward explains: “When she heard that her rabbi 
1 It is noteworthy, however, that in the same survey, 69% of Jews believe that the Jewish community has 
an obligation to encourage Jews to marry other Jews. The contradiction between the ascription of racism and the 
promotion of in-marriage is striking. This heightens the sense that deeply felt values are in conflict. For the com-
plete survey, see: www.ajc.org/site/apps/nlnet/content3.aspx?c=ijITI2PHKoG&b=846741&ct=1042043.
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knew about the [photo] shoot, [she said] “Watching him deliver the sermon, I al-
most felt wrong. I was there atoning for my sins, but I don’t feel like I’ve sinned 
[with Playboy]. I’m not hurting anyone.”” 
For Ms. Vuolo, what constitutes the categories of the “religiously wrong” or 
“sin”? It would be religiously wrong for someone to exploit—to use or take unfair 
advantage of—someone else. It would be a sin to hurt, which apparently means, to 
infringe on the freedom of action, of someone else. But since, on her account, she 
hasn’t done either of these things her moral conscience is clear. Perhaps her rabbi, 
whose sermons she watches rather than hears, never preached on tzniyut (mode-
sty). Most likely the Judaism articulated in her temple makes no room for tzniyut 
because, in terms of the prevailing liberal paradigm, it would be a personal lifestyle 
choice rather than a feature of a Jewish public morality. The very idea of a public 
morality would appear to violate the liberal respect for the privacy and autonomy 
of persons. And so two millennia of Jewish law and custom drop from view, as 
religious rights and wrongs, sins and virtues are reconstituted along the moral lines 
of a competing, virtually hegemonic liberal culture.
We are now in a better position to get an idea of the American Jewish version 
of the theological-political predicament. Liberalism, deeply felt although perhaps 
poorly understood, has moved from the political sphere to the religious one. It 
has colonized the Jewish religious and moral imagination. The liberalism to which 
I refer is not contemporary liberalism, in the sense of that set of ideas and values 
to which contemporary conservatism is opposed. Rather, I refer to the ancestor of 
both contemporary liberalism and contemporary conservatism in all their varia-
tions—that stream of political thought that places individuals and their liberty, equ-
ality, and agency at the normative center.2 There is much to celebrate in the liberal 
tradition. We are all its beneficiaries and almost no one, Jew or gentile, wishes to 
live under a non-liberal regime when he has a choice in the matter. Nonetheless, 
liberalism becomes a predicament or crisis for American Jews when its premises 
and cultural effects subvert or imperil the continued existence of the Jews themse-
lves. Were the views of those Jews who believe that Jewish endogamy is racist or 
that Judaism is an afterthought of the principle of non-interference to become truly 
dominant, then it would be difficult to see what future American Jewry could have, 
or deserve.
The task then is to reconfigure the relationship between the liberal tradi-
tion and the Jewish tradition such that their respective spheres of influence achieve 
a proper relationship. In the past, this relationship has often been styled as one of 
universalism versus particularism. I believe that this is profoundly misleading. As 
if we were not already sufficiently aware of it, the events of September 11 remind 
us that the liberal tradition is also a particularism. Other streams of civilization, 
such as Islam, do not share its anthropological, political, and normative assump-
tions. Both liberalism and Judaism are particularisms with universal aspirations. 
2 D. Johnston, The Idea of a Liberal Theory, Princeton 1994, p. 17.
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As particularisms, they ought to be able to find a mutually enriching co-existence. 
It is only when the universal intention of liberalism seeks to overwhelm Jewish 
particularism that trouble—both for the Jews and for liberalism itself—ensues. Or, 
alternately, trouble ensues when Jews equate the universal intention of liberalism 
with the universal intention of Judaism.
In the following, I will attempt to analyze how that co-existence has gone 
awry and how it might be made to work. My assumption is that the theological-
political nexus of Judaism and liberalism cannot be severed, nor should it be. We 
must work from within the connection. Given the theological-political predica-
ment, Jews are dependent upon liberalism. I argue that they must resist that upon 
which they depend. I also claim that liberalism will become more capacious and 
less monistic—to use Jean Bethke Elshtain’s terms—through the force of their re-
sistance. In resisting monistic liberalism, Jews can draw on the resources of their 
own political tradition and perhaps enrich the liberal tradition in the process.
The liberal tradition is about liberty. There were, as Quentin Skinner points 
out, traditions of liberty before liberalism.3 Liberty before liberalism was grounded 
in Roman republican thought and appropriated by Renaissance neo-Roman thin-
kers such as Machiavelli. Such British thinkers as Milton, Harrington, and Sidney 
were advocates of liberty without being in the precise sense liberals. A tradition 
of liberty is also found in the Jewish political tradition. The Israelites are liberated 
from Egypt to serve God and to govern themselves or, at least immediately, to be 
governed by Him through His prophet. In both traditions of liberty, the emphasis is 
positive: self-rule and shared forms of life orient persons toward a common good. 
In the liberal tradition as such, liberty extends to individuals who are perfectly free 
to separate themselves from shared forms of life, public ideas of the good, and thick 
bonds of solidarity and sentiment. The idea of negative liberty, always in some state 
of tension with earlier republican currents of positive liberty, infiltrates the liberal 
tradition.4
Although Judaism seems plighted to a positive conception of liberty such 
that it could be on a collision course with liberalism, there is nothing in the liberal 
tradition that is necessarily subversive of Judaism. The liberal tradition, at least 
in the United States, mitigates its own emphasis on individual autonomy by con-
stitutional protections of freedom of association. That is, liberalism understands 
that human sociality is not incidental to human individuality. Humans are radically 
social. The Constitution takes the freedom to associate with one another, and by 
implication, with one’s kind as a natural right. Nonetheless, the agents who are free 
to associate with one another are individuals. The Constitution does not take notice 
of primordial groups, of collectivities as the building blocks of political society. 
If there are such collectivities, they are, in the Constitution’s universe, the states. 
3 Q .Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge 1998, chapter 1 passim.
4 I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, New York 1969, chapter 3. For the best recent exposition of this 
often caricatured concept, see J. Gray, Isaiah Berlin, Princeton 1996, chapter 1.
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But the states are also unions of individuals. Nor does the Constitution have regard 
for the civil society institutions such as schools, families, and churches that gene-
rate the virtues which a democratic citizenry requires. The Constitution does not 
consider those forms of spiritual cement that weld individuals into a democratic 
political community. Thus, despite a generous space that American liberalism gives 
to religious and other primordial communities there is an underlying bias built in 
to the system in favor of the individual, the free, reasonable moral agent over the 
encumbered and implicated member of a primordial group. 
The liberal ontology, which places individuals at the center, animates one of 
the canonical texts of the liberal tradition, Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration. In 
this text, we can find that bias in favor of the individual, which eventually creates 
a problem for groups like the Jews. In the Letter Locke finds a parallel between the 
church and the state. The Church, he writes, is a “free and voluntary association 
of individuals.”5 Constituting a church is directly parallel to constituting a political 
community: it is an act of free and consenting adults. Both kinds of community are 
governed by a purposive rationality. The aim of the political community is civil 
peace; the aim of the religious community is the public worship of God for the end 
of the salvation of the individual soul. Individuals are free to judge whether the 
religious community suits their spiritual needs or not. If they remain within it, they 
are subject to its laws and discipline, although these have no positive or negative re-
levance to their civil status as citizens. The religious community is as easily entered 
as left. The free, rational person judges whether the community’s reasonableness is 
compatible with his own.
Locke’s construction of the religious community requires a sweeping de-
emphasis on those bonds of sociality that are more primordial than rational as-
sent alone. He is suspicious of loyalty and friendship; he sees them as potential 
allies of subservience.6 The idea that religious community might claim us before 
we as conscious agents choose it provokes anxiety. Locke’s treatment of Islam in 
the Letter—Muslims are not just men of faith but servants of the Ottoman sultan 
and therefore sources of sedition within the state—suggests that religious com-
munities which do not fit his secularized Protestant model of gathered community 
need not be tolerated. The Jews, I would argue, resemble Locke’s Muslims more 
than his Protestant sectaries. Although neither then nor now citizens or subjects of 
a foreign sovereign, Jews nonetheless participate in an older, more metaphysically 
encumbering form of theological-political community than Locke would allow for. 
Participation in the Jewish covenantal polity precedes the entry of individual Jews 
into civil society and carries its own set of obligations.
As an example of this claim, consider Locke’s statement in An Essay Con-
cerning Human Understanding (Book II, Chapter XXI, para. 56) regarding one’s 
choice of diet.
5 J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, [in:] Treatise of Civil Government, New York 1939, p. 175.
6 D. Kries, Piety and Humanity, Lanham 1997.
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“All men seek happiness, but not of the same sort. The mind has a different 
relish, as well as the palate; and you will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight all men 
with riches or glory (which yet some men place their happiness in) as you would to 
satisfy all men’s hunger with cheese or lobsters; which, though very agreeable and 
delicious fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive: and many 
persons would with reason prefer the griping of an hungry belly to those dishes 
which are a feast to others.”
Locke writes about lobsters as if they were an illustration of the principle of 
“de gustibus non est disputandem.” It is merely a matter of taste in which reason 
has no share. The observation is part of a larger argument that deprives the classi-
cal, primarily Aristotelian, claim that there is a single standard of eudaemonia of its 
sense. There is no summum bonum, Locke assures us, no way of human flourishing 
common to us all. There are only particular goods or individual versions of hap-
piness based on idiosyncratic choices. Some find lobsters and cheese tasty while 
others do not. The idea that God might prohibit us from tasting lobsters in the first 
place and that this prohibition binds us even before we were born, as it were, would 
strike him as bizarre. It is a “speculative opinion” about something that is at best 
“indifferent.” Jewish worship is, as he elsewhere puts it, “false” and “abominable.”7
Of less concern than Locke’s anti-Judaism is his construction of religious 
community as a purely consensual association of likeminded individuals. Since 
early modernity, Jews have attempted the transformation of the Jewish polity, with 
its covenantal dimensions of reciprocity, obligation and law, into a Lockean-liberal 
church. Beginning with Moses Mendelssohn, they have subtly replaced the lan-
guage of covenant with its secular descendant, social contract, effacing although 
never quite obliterating the older political resonances of Jewish national solidarity. 
At the dawn of the liberal order, the choice was between remaining within an in-
tegral kehillah—the misnamed “state within a state”—or assuming the rights and 
duties of citizenship in a state that was supposed to transcend religious and ethnic 
particularities. That project is now complete, at least in the United States. Jews 
reconstituted their diaspora polity as a voluntary community, a free association of 
citizens of Jewish affiliation, with remarkable success. To the extent that pervasi-
ve anti-Semitism encompassed the liberal creation of a voluntaristic community, 
a certain continuity with older lines of group consciousness endured. With the we-
lcome decline of anti-Semitism, however, the voluntarist project of Diaspora Jewry 
is left on its own to compete with other forms of private association in which per-
sons may find satisfaction. It is not that Jewish life is a poor competitor—far from 
it. It is that Jewish life must continuously redefine itself in terms adopted from 
liberalism in order to appear intelligible and appealing to the denizens of a liberal 
order. The appearance of paid advertisements on the Op-Ed page of the New York 
Times in which prominent figures gave personal answers to the question “Why be 
Jewish?” is a sign of the times.
7 J. Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 218.
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As Stephen Cohen and Arnold Eisen have essayed in their 2001 book, The 
Jew Within, the emphasis on voluntarism, individual choice, personal as opposed to 
public standards of meaning has eroded loyalty to communal institutions, indeed, 
to Israel, the most powerful symbolic locus of Jewish national solidarity.8 Con-
temporary Jews are increasingly drawn to an inward-looking, self-oriented search 
for meaning rather than to communal engagement and Jewish civic participation. 
The focus of their study is the private spiritual journey of what the authors call the 
“sovereign self.” The sovereign self is not animated by duties to other humans or 
to God, or by the aspiration to achieve what T.H. Green called the “best self.” It is 
merely an expressive self, in love with its own depths and fascinated by its own 
protean contours. The project of making this self is an end in itself. It signifies 
the ultimacy of freedom or, more precisely, the inability or unwillingness to posit 
a goal beyond freedom. Freedom is not to be ordered by higher goods. Rather, 
freedom, in the sense of the negative freedom to act without coercion, has become 
the highest good.
The Jewish tradition, as mentioned above, is no stranger to the value of fre-
edom. Nonetheless, in the Jewish tradition there is a strong bias toward freedom as 
a positive and instrumental value. Freedom facilitates the pursuit of collective and 
individual holiness. Freedom allows for self-rule, for the project of creating a just 
and holy commonwealth. These ideas are resisted and—for the sake of civil peace 
in a pluralistic society—properly so by liberalism. Liberalism in its origins overca-
me both an aristocratic and a republican tradition that saw politics as a means to the 
achievement of public virtue. In the American version of liberal origins, the Puritan 
covenantal tradition was overcome in favor of an Enlightenment social contracta-
rianism. American Jews, despite the bias of the Jewish political tradition in favor 
of positive liberty, came to share in the liberal disregard for aims allegedly higher 
than negative liberty. The bulk of their political engagement, advocacy for Israel 
excepted, has been devoted to projects of negative liberty, such as fighting discrimi-
nation and clearing the public square of the last vestiges of the Puritan covenantal 
tradition. American Jews have been piously devoted to what Richard John Neuhaus 
famously called the “naked public square.” By working to strip public discourse 
and civic life of older, republican and religious expressions of solidarity, Jews hel-
ped to advance a version of liberalism that valorizes individual autonomy, rights 
and freedom of choice over community, obligation, and prudence. Nonetheless, 
were it not for older countervailing forms of group solidarity, such as tzedakah (in-
adequately translated, charity), Jewish communities would not, most likely, have 
endured under the centrifugal forces of liberalism. Tzedakah is a project of positive 
liberty. It presupposes that individuals are encumbered rather than self-possessed; 
that they have duties to a collectivity that significantly impinge on their freedom of 
choice and their discretion over their possessions. 
8 S. M. Cohen, A. Eisen, The Jew Within, Bloomington 2001.
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The continued Jewish embrace of tzedakah is an example of how Jews resist 
assimilation to a purely liberal pattern of life without being aware of it.
The transformations that have given us Cohen and Eisen’s impoverished 
“sovereign self” need not be seen as the simple outcome of a clash of cultures, 
of liberalism versus Judaism. On the contrary, they track a movement within li-
beralism itself, on which Judaism, caught in a theological-political predicament, 
depends. The transformation within liberalism has to do with the loss of liberali-
sm’s republican heritage, with an undue emphasis on individual rights and negative 
liberty, with a decline civic participation and social trust, as well as over-reliance 
on government and the courts to solve social problems. It also has to do with the 
increasing secularization of American society and the privatization of religion, pro-
cesses which the Jewish community has done much to advance. These factors have 
had a leveling effect, which has diminished the moral authority of the liberal tra-
dition and the Jewish tradition as well. The way back from this mutual diminution 
requires moral and spiritual renewal. It requires a new appreciation for the sources 
of moral and spiritual renewal, those local communities, especially religious ones, 
and the virtuous selves that they nurture. It requires a new appreciation of how the 
moral formation of citizens occurs in communities and in families, as well as for 
those thick traditions of moral life without which moral formation cannot occur.
For Jews this renewal will require a retrieval of older and more complex mo-
ral constitutions of selfhood and community than contemporary liberal doctrines of 
rights, agency and voluntarism allow for. Such concepts as covenantal liberty (as 
opposed to liberal natural liberty) and divine ownership of our persons (as opposed 
to liberal autonomy) will have to get a contemporary, morally cogent articulation. 
Politically, I would argue, Jews need to resist the leveling influence of liberal poli-
tical culture by advocating those policies that strengthen communities and reverse 
the privatization of religion. This will cut against the grain of previous Jewish pu-
blic policy advocacy.
Let us focus for the moment on a constitutional issue in which the Jewish 
community has been heavily invested, religious liberty and the separation of church 
and state. Michael Sandel calls our attention to the modern misreading of the reli-
gion clauses of the Constitution. On Sandel’s account, the Founders based the right 
to religious liberty on the freedom of conscience while the moderns have transfor-
med this into a freedom of choice. By “freedom of conscience” Sandel means the 
duty to worship God in a manner free from external coercion. In both Locke and 
Madison and Jefferson, religious liberty is necessary because conscience imposes 
duties on us that are prior to the claims of civil society. “Religious liberty,” San-
del writes, “addressed the problem of encumbered selves, claimed by duties they 
cannot renounce, even in the face of civil obligations that may conflict.”9 To the 
greatest extent possible, a decent and liberal politics requires that persons not be 
forced to violate their deepest, most constitutive convictions. For many, the convic-
9 M. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, Cambridge 1996, p. 66.
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tion of faith is not chosen or willed: it is given by grace or, in the normal Jewish 
case, given by birth. Religious liberty is the acknowledgment that duties to God 
must be accommodated. It grows, as in Locke’s Letter or Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance, out of a consciousness still stirred by religion in which the advo-
cate of toleration or of liberty understands that our duties to God are radical, real, 
and unique. The self is not sovereign; it is “encumbered.” It does not fully possess 
itself. It is possessed by God, to whom it must give fealty.
By contrast, the modern, fully secularized approach to religious liberty treats 
it as a sign of respect for a species of personal choice. What religious liberty accom-
modates on the modern, voluntarist account is not duty but autonomy. What it pre-
serves is not freedom of conscience, which can be the most demanding master, but 
freedom of choice, which seldom aspires to moral austerity. In Sandel’s view, the 
transformation in our understanding of religious liberty is ultimately subversive of 
religious liberty. It is one thing for the state to have to accommodate the patterned 
duties of historic religious communities and their adherents. (The law, for example, 
eventually made room for conscientious objector status in order to accommodate 
Mennonites and other traditional pacifists.) It is another thing for the state to have 
to respect individual choices. On the former account, the state allows for religious 
exemptions precisely because they are religious. The state recognizes the impor-
tance of religious communities and their adherents for civil society. On the latter 
account, the state presumes a neutral stance between religion and non-religion. It 
forbears from recognizing religion as a public good. It aspires to a neutrality that 
respects persons irrespective of the content of their choices and beliefs. As such, it 
recasts the demands of religious conscience into mere personal choice. Since one 
person’s choice is not necessarily more worthy of accommodation than another’s, 
religion becomes just another lifestyle option, with no more compelling claim on 
the state for accommodation than trout fishing.
When the state of Connecticut sought to accommodate the religious beliefs 
of sabbatarians by allowing them, alone among all employees, to choose their day 
off, the Supreme Court overruled the statute on the grounds that Sabbath observers 
should not be given choices that others do not have. The law allowing Sabbath 
observers to choose Saturday as their day off unfairly discriminated against others 
who were not given the right to choose. So too, Captain Simcha Goldman was not 
allowed to wear distinctive headgear if all others lacked a similar right. Nor were 
Native Americans allowed to use peyote in defiance of otherwise valid drug laws. 
In every case, what was formerly thought a duty of conscience properly protec-
ted by the Free Exercise clause became a personal choice that can neither confer 
“special rights” on a few nor trump generally applicable law. The reduction of 
conscience to choice, of religious liberty to a species of freedom of expression 
erodes our cultural understanding of what religious liberty is for and imperils our 
support for it over the long term. The welcome reversal by the Court of some of 
these trends in Good News Club v. Milford School District was decided more on 
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free speech than free exercise grounds. Free exercise since Smith is an endangered 
right; free speech has more plausibility in contemporary jurisprudence. Indeed it 
has more of a “plausibility structure” beneath it than free exercise. The scanting and 
deformation of free exercise, abetted by a five decade long emphasis on unrealisti-
cally stringent establishment standards, serves neither the aims of liberalism nor of 
American Jews. The very existence of the Free Exercise clause and of the singular 
and distinctive position that religious liberty occupies in the Constitution should 
signal to us that religion does play a crucial role in civil society; that it must not be 
reduced to a lifestyle option or to the mere choice of private persons.
Sen. Joseph Lieberman, during the 2001 election campaign, called atten-
tion to this fact, quite controversially in the eyes of many Jewish leaders, when he 
said that the Constitution gives us freedom for religion rather than freedom from 
religion. Lieberman was, in his own way, resisting what the political theorist Jean 
Bethke Elshtain calls “liberal monism.”10 By liberal monism, she refers to a drive 
within liberal societies to bring discrepant standards of authority, reason and moral 
language under a single norm. A monistic approach to authority, for example, wo-
uld force the Catholic Church, perhaps through legal challenges, to accept women 
as priests. It would force an Orthodox institution, such as a college of Yeshiva 
University, to accommodate gay partners as a married couple. A monistic approach 
to reason reads religious moral reasoning out of the public conversation as a defec-
tive, regressive or merely idiosyncratic expression. A monistic approach to moral 
language reduces all normative discourse to what Mary Ann Glendon calls rights 
talk, to claims and counter-claims of rights unmitigated by such frameworks as 
virtue or aspiration. Monistic liberalism, on Elshtain’s account, receives powerful 
support from the intellectuals and the media. It is also, I think, the preference of 
American Jews. It is this preference that Jews must learn to discern and resist.
Taking a cue from Sandel, American Jews need to recover the original libe-
ral concept of the duties of conscience, which is not far removed from the Jewish 
concept of mitzvot bein adam l’makom (duties between man and God). It is out of 
respect for the duties that man has toward God that the liberal, constitutional state 
first circumscribed its own power. To take such duties seriously, as duties that claim 
us rather than as choices that we elect, reveals our embeddedness in an order that is 
metaphysically prior to the liberal order in which we dwell. It qualifies and relativi-
zes our belonging to the polity. Alternately, it makes us morally serious and respon-
sible persons who can serve the liberal polity with our learned habits of both loyalty 
and criticism. To retrieve a doctrine of the duties of conscience or of the mitzvot 
bein adam l’makom would help rescue contemporary Judaism from the platitudes 
of liberalism on the one side and the temptations of otherworldly or Gnostic spiri-
tualism on the other. It would rescue Judaism from becoming a distinction without 
a difference. Here is a relatively recent example of how to assert a distinction, ba-
sed on conscience, and resist monistic liberalism at the same time.
10 J. B. Elshtain, Address Delivered at Radio Free Europe, Prague 2000, www.becketfund.org.
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The Orthodox Jewish community of Tenafly, NJ was ordered by the munici-
pality and, on August 9, 2001, the U.S. District court, to remove an eruv that it had 
erected with the help of Verizon and a local cable company (Forward, November 
16, 2001; www.becketfund.org). Needless to say, some of the members of the bo-
rough council were Jewish. They took the liberal monist view that for the state to 
endorse the eruv would be an impermissible violation of the Establishment clause. 
(Given the current state of Establishment clause jurisprudence, this may not be far-
fetched.) Whether this constitutional quibble is a fig leaf for a darker bias against 
Orthodox Jews is unclear. At any rate, the Jewish members of the borough council 
who are Reform Jews were quite surprised when the Commission on Social Action 
of Reform Judaism filed a brief on the side of the eruv proponents, who have now 
brought the case to an appeals court. No one was surprised that the Orthodox Union 
or the Agudah filed amicus briefs but Reform’s deviation from strict separationist 
dogmatism took the Jewish politicians off guard. This seems to me a salutary case 
of a religious movement almost wholly identified with contemporary liberalism 
stepping back from redundancy. In advocating a position that honors religious li-
berty and affirms that Shabbat observance, which is enhanced by an eruv, is a duty 
of Jewish conscience, the Reform movement resisted monistic liberalism.
The Jewish self, possessed by the mitzvoth of Shabbat, is surely more com-
plex and possibly more conflicted than the autonomous, expressive self of contem-
porary liberalism. I would argue that it is precisely such a self that liberalism needs 
if it is to become, in Elshtain’s words, more capacious. Liberalism needs com-
munities where such morally complex selves are formed. These are the so-called 
“seedbeds of virtue” where the habits of the heart, the habits of loyalty, respect for 
legitimate social authority, perseverance, altruism and independence are cultivated. 
Liberalism, as William Galston reminds us, needs its own virtues. A healthy liberal 
society cultivates virtues in its citizens. American Jews need to ask themselves 
whether the laws and policies they advocate cultivate the virtues and strengthen the 
communities that nurture them. The Jewish community’s opposition to the faith-
based initiative during the Bush years was not encouraging in this regard.
The Jewish community first tacked in the strict separationist direction: pu-
blic funding to social services delivered by houses of worship would violate the 
Establishment clause. Insofar as there already were four years of experimentation 
under prior law, however, the community began to back away from this strategy by 
the end of 2000. (The endorsement by both Gore and Lieberman of some version 
of charitable choice also complicated the mainstream Jewish approach to the pro-
blem.) The next stratagem stressed the potential for discrimination against religio-
us, ethnic or sexual minorities. The Title VII exemption permitting religious bodies 
to hire only their own members, if extended under charitable choice, would amount 
to state-sponsored discrimination. The prospect of religious ministries refusing to 
hire persons of other faiths or disapproved sexual orientation was thought to trump 
all other considerations. Additionally, the fear that Jewish agencies might face in-
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creased competition for funds also played a role. In sum, Jewish groups, with the 
exception of the Orthodox, opposed charitable choice out of a mix of high principle 
and interest politics. Two full election cycles later, the Jewish community’s attitude 
remains the same. The continued embrace of faith based solutions by some De-
mocratic elites, including President Obama, poses a challenge for American Jews.
At the beginning of the debate, during the early Bush presidency, a clarifying 
moment for me occurred one evening on national television. A commentator was 
interviewing a rabbi and a black minister, who was—like most blacks—an advoca-
te for charitable choice. At one point in their debate, the commentator interrupted 
and observed that there was a striking asymmetry in their positions. The minister 
was talking about urgent and debilitating human need and what could be done to al-
leviate it while the rabbi was talking about abstract constitutional principles. Even 
she felt a jarring disjunction between the worlds that the two sides represented.
This disjunction is emblematic of how the Jewish community treats such 
matters. It is so wedded to the liberal monist imperative of keeping religion private 
that it is unwilling to experiment with promising new possibilities for alleviating 
the misery of our most neglected citizens. While I would never fault the Jewish 
community for its philanthropy, its covenantal habits of tzedakah, or for its pu-
blic-mindedness, I do think that it is wrong on charitable choice and on a kindred 
idea, tuition vouchers. In both of these cases, community serving ministries and 
community enhancing schools might well be strengthened by an infusion of public 
funds. The long-term interest of the Jewish community as well as that of American 
liberalism lies in strengthening the institutions of civil society, both general and Je-
wish. Jews should seek alternatives to state monopolies; they should be on the side 
of local control and participatory democracy. There were, of course, good reasons 
for turning to the state and the courts, particularly in the 1960’s. But do we not face 
a different set of problems today?
The way out of the theological-political predicament of American Jews lies 
in a double movement of retrieval. Not only Jews but all Americans must retrieve 
a fuller range of liberal possibilities than contemporary, anemic liberalism provi-
des. For their part, Jews must also retrieve older ideas of Jewish selfhood, virtue, 
and polity; of the liberty that Judaism celebrated long before liberalism.
This essay originally appeared in Religion as a Public Good, edited by Alan Mittleman (Row-
man & Littlefield Publishers, 2003). It is reprinted here, in a slightly revised and updated version, by 
permission of the publisher.
